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The purpose of this article is to show that the current European Union
(eu) legal framework is unnecessarily restrictive and unduly suppresses
economic and developmental initiatives in many stagnating regions across
Europe. More innovative industrial policies, instruments and measures
should be adopted in a highly decentralized manner across the eu. Be-
tween the ‘laissez-faire’ and ‘dirigiste’ approaches, there is significant room
to manoeuvre for more pro-active industrial and development policies.
New forms of industrial policies could and should be reinvented and im-
plemented across the eu – not to harm or distort competition, but rather
to further enhance it. More than one form and framework exist for a Single
Market and for the competition policies. Modern industrial policy presup-
poses high-quality public institutions with highly competent administra-
tion. It requires autonomy and accountability of the public administration
to counter the pressures of various interest groups. The proposal to revive
and articulate modern types of industrial policies across the eu is a call
for comprehensive economic and social restructuring. The task of modern
industrial policy is to organize and strengthen capabilities of restructuring
in the direction of high-productivity activities.
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to show that the current European Union
(eu) legal framework is unnecessarily restrictive and that it unduly sup-
presses economic and developmental initiatives in many stagnating re-
gions across Europe. In a growth-friendly context, various initiatives and
development strategies based on local knowledge and local needs should
stem from diverse European regions and member states. If the eu gen-
uinely intends to overcome the protracting economic, financial and social
crisis and engage in economic reconstruction,modern types of industrial
policy will have to be reinvented. This is true not only for the large parts
of European regions andmember states that suffer from protracting stag-
nation, lack of growth, high levels of unemployment and long-term loss
Managing Global Transitions 12 (2): 179–194
180 Matjaž Nahtigal
of competitiveness but also for the advanced and successful European re-
gions that want to remain competitive internationally.
Instead of remaining hostage to the dogma of free-market neutrality,
the authorities at all levels of European polity should envisage the pos-
sibility of broadening and deepening access to markets for more people
in more ways (Unger 2007, 144). Spontaneous market initiatives can be
combined with the deliberate actions of public authorities. Rodrik (2011)
pointed out that markets and governments are complements, not substi-
tutes. High-quality public institutions and good governance of the pub-
lic sector are the necessary conditions for the successful development of
themarket economy (Rodrik 2011, 196–208). The term industrial policy is
used in its broadest sense to refer to any form of deliberate public activity
– at the local, regional, national or supra-national level – that contributes
to productive capabilities and improved competitiveness. The distinction
between the ‘old’ type of industrial policy – predominantly in the form of
state intervention in the markets – and the ‘new’ type of industrial policy
– in the form of stimulating the creation of firms and promoting inno-
vation and competitiveness (for the distinction between these types, see
Bianchi and Labory 2006, xv) – will be taken into account in the discus-
sion on the future of European industrial policy.
In the period when even British government officials like Vince Cable,
the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills, state that ‘pure
laissez-faire does not work’ (Wintour and Mulholland 2011), the debate
on the possibilities of enhancing the role and scope of modern indus-
trial policy in Europe should finally overcome the traditional ideology.
The debate on the future of modern industrial policy in Europe should
become a debate on the productive potential of industrial policy and on
the strategic partnership between the public and private sectors. The fu-
turemodel should resemble the first period of European integration, with
much more room for the member states and their regions to manoeu-
vre while running and developing their economies. The difference with
the traditional industrial policy, however, is that themodern ‘knowledge-
based economy’ requires substantially different policies and instruments
in order to stimulate high value added, as well as innovative and flexi-
ble business practices, in comparison with the ‘old’ style of government
interventionism.
The first part of this article will analyze the eu legal framework for in-
dustrial policy. The second part will examine the dogma of neutrality of
the European Single Market. The third part of the article will discuss the
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possibilities to open up space for a plurality of industrial and develop-
ment policies, using examples of successful regional industrial policies in
some of the most advanced European regions. These examples are often
neglected in discussions on the future of European industrial policy.
The examples of successful European regions will serve as a source of
inspiration and encouragement to disseminate their successful practices
to the stagnating European regions. The intention of this discussion is
not to propose mechanical imitation of these regions, but rather to offer
examples of advance regions as a source of inspiration.
Finally, by analyzing the existing eu legal framework for industrial
policy, this article aims to examine the most successful practices from
advanced European regions in order to determine the ingredients and
the risks associated with successful industrial policy, as well as how the
European legal framework should be adjusted to the need for inclusive
and balanced development from the perspective of stagnating European
regions, member states and excluded parts of the European population.
This adjustment should be made in such a way that opportunities will be
opened up for all of the European citizens and businesses that are waiting
in vain to experience the anticipated benefits of the laissez-faire version
of a European Single Market.
Current eu Legal Framework for Industrial Policy
The current eu framework is primarily based on the concept of negative
integration, which is characterized by the member states’ gradual loss of
many traditional economic powers and instruments. On the other hand,
the process of positive integration in the form of harmonization at the
European level took a gradual and different path. It has not replicated tra-
ditional instruments and powers at the supranational level but rather has
focused on harmonization and the adoption of common standard. The
debates regarding which areas, competences and instruments should be
transferred to the European level have been a source of constant discus-
sion and conflict, most notably during the Convention on the Future of
Europe, which attempted to clarify divisions of competences and powers.
The idea behind the Single Market version of European integration
and completion is that the liberalized Single Market should provide im-
mense benefits for its participants and actors. Assessments and estimates
about the benefits of the Single Market were presented in the well-known
‘Cecchini’ report ‘Europe 1992 – The Overall Challenge’ (Commission of
the European Communities 1988) This report calculated an enormous
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reduction of costs due to the removal of remaining barriers, enormous
improvements of efficiency due to improved competition and economy
of scale and a substantial boost of employment.
In the context of the Maastricht treaty, these estimates and anticipated
gains presented the basis for the completion of the Single Market, which
was a key goal of European leaders and European institutions to which
all other priorities, policies and instruments at the national and European
levels should be adjusted. The less the governments would try to distort
the SingleMarket, the faster the remaining barriers are being removed the
greater would be benefits and efficiency gains emanating from the Single
Market.
Other goals, such as the reduction of inter-regional disparities within
the eu, the preservation of the social welfare at the level ofmember states,
and the adoption of any form of industrial policy – in the form of either
‘old’ or ‘new’ industrial policy – could be employed only to the extent that
doing so would not interfere with the completion of a Single Market. The
completion of a Single Market has become a goal in itself. The motto for
uncritical supporters of a European Single Market as the regional version
of the freemarket continues to be that themore complete the SingleMar-
ket becomes, the better things will be for everyone (Pelkmans 2011).
In the context of the completion of a Single Market, industrial policy –
which was already diluted because of the unclear division of competences
and the general shift toward economic orthodoxy on the global and Eu-
ropean level – has become constrained. More often than not, industrial
policy has involved merely the lip service of European officials with little
actual substance.
Article 157 ec (ex Article 130), which is dedicated to Industry, can
be understood in the context of the Article 4 ec governing principle of
‘open market economy with free competition.’ As explained by Pelkmans
(2006, 60), both eu and its member states have committed themselves
to the governing principle of internal market governance, which nar-
rowed the scope for industrial policy: ‘[S]ince member states have ex-
plicitly agreed with this set-up, one could interpret the framework as a
quasi-institutional denial to fall back on interventionist industrial policy
in the future.’
Even this highly constrained reference to industrial policy in Article
157 ec was very difficult to adopt during theMaastricht negotiation. The
Article itself has an explicit limitation preventing the adopting of any
measures, which could lead to a distortion of competition. Article 157
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ec has become Article 173 of tfeu after adoption of the Lisbon treaty,
whereby the role of Commission in the second paragraph has become
marginally more specified. No other changes to this Article 157 ec (ex
Article 130 ec) were made since its adoption during the Maastricht ne-
gotiation.
The limitations of the scope of industrial policy in the European le-
gal framework can be explained by the historical background of their
institutional development, national preferences according to the ‘vari-
eties of capitalism’ concept, and negotiation strategies behind the adop-
tion of the article on industrial policies. The historical background of this
topic was analyzed by Fioretos (2001, 227), who pointed out that, before
the Maastricht treaty, ‘the ec’s industrial policy had primarily been de-
signed for market liberalization and the abolishment of discriminatory
subsidies, and nowhere could one find a statement suggesting that the
Community have an activist and interventionist industrial policy.’ All of
the key actors had in mind their own preferences and interests. Britain,
for example, opposed the adoption of industrial policy because of its (at
that time) superior performance ‘by enhancing market mechanism [. . .]
thus, the primary concern for the British was to extend the economic area
regulated by the ec in a fashion that would enhance the market mech-
anism and provide British firms with an environment they were accus-
tomed to and that would ensure their competitive edge.’ (Fioretos 2001,
231–232, footnotes omitted). On the other hand, France advocated amore
proactive industrial policy based on its dirigiste tradition of an interven-
tionist industrial policy; together with Italy, France advocated for greater
authority of the European Commission in the area of industrial policy
to strengthen the competitiveness of European industry (Fioretos 2001,
227). The attempt to ‘trump competition policy’ and the restrictions on
state aid were also supported by the Belgian government (Church and
Phinnemore 2002, 345).
Finally, Germany stood as another key actor between the maximal-
ist French proposal and the minimalist British proposal. Germany was
supportive of the insertion of an industrial policy clause committed to
horizontal industrial policy and large-scale research projects. This was
consistent with the German regulatory tradition in the area of indus-
trial policy and with the German interests: ‘[T]he German position rests
on regulatory principles of the coordinated market economy (cme), and
the calculation that a limited ec industrial policy have beneficial effects
for German producers in areas (especially high-tech) where the German
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market economy has been relatively weak’ (Fioretos 2001, 238, footnotes
omitted).
The background context of insertion of the article on industrial policy
is particularly revealing for several reasons. First, it shows that the key
actors in the eu acted based on their preferences and the interests of the
industries, as well as based on the industrial policy tradition in the key
member states. Second, the aim of the key member states was to secure
or even improve the position of their industries on the internal market.
Third, neither the balance between competition and proactive industrial
policy nor the outcome of the crucial provisions of the Maastricht treaty
and all subsequent treaties is objective and neutral; rather, these are the
result of bargaining powers, national preferences and beliefs regarding
how the governing principles and rules should shape a European Single
Market.
Despite various attempts to substantially redefine the relations among
cohesion, research and development, proactive policies and the undis-
tortedmarkets, the conclusion is that the principle of undistorted compe-
tition enjoys primacy (Church and Phinnemore 2002, 346). In this highly
constrained context, the eu and the member states did develop several
instruments and policies in the areas of research, improved skills, innova-
tions, and various schemes to support small andmedium size enterprises
(smes). On the other hand, sectoral and specific industrial policy almost
entirely disappeared (Pelkmans 2006, 73).
The European legal framework with respect to the role and scope of
industrial policy has not changed significantly over the last two decades.
During the Convention on the Future of Europe, the working group on
economic governance under the chair Klaus Hänsch was established to
explore, among other topics, the changes in the area of economic coor-
dination, but it did not present any particular new proposal of enhanced
cooperation with respect to industrial policy (see the European Conven-
tion2002).
In the last two decades, sporadic attempts have been made to more
strongly articulate industrial policy at the European level and the level of
the member states. One such attempt was the report of former Dutch
Prime Minister Wim Kok and others in 2003, when the eu was con-
fronted with low rates of growth, increased unemployment and the un-
successful implementation of the Lisbon treaty. In the report, the gov-
ernments and the eu were urged to take a more proactive stand in the
areas of infrastructure and knowledge. In Kok’s foreword to the report,
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he stated that the member states must take primary responsibility to act
and the eu must support them (Kok 2003). The report also addressed
the need to reskill workers in traditional industries in order to adapt to
the needs of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ throughout the eu. As an
example, the report mentioned the successful restructuring of Italian in-
dustrial districts with the help of small firmgrowth and the dissemination
of knowledge and innovations among a network of firms (25). However,
even the occasional calls for more aggressive industrial policy across Eu-
rope, such as those offered by Kok, were described as ‘too little too late’
by Pelkmans (2006, 66).
Persistence of the Dogma of Neutrality
of a European Single Market
At the heart of the eu’s framework is the belief that the European Single
Market version of the free market, free of any distortion, will work most
efficiently. They claim that in order to overcome the current protracted
economic, financial and social crisis – which is the largest crisis since
the beginning of the eu – it is necessary to implement more of a Single
Market (Pelkmans 2011).
However, proponents of the current version of the European Single
Market as the best possible answer to all of the economic, financial and
social difficulties in Europe tend to forget several things. First of all, they
tend to ignore the fact that the existing European legal framework, which
has been in place for the last two decades, is a result of bargaining pow-
ers, national interests and preferences rather than a result of the natural,
neutral development of the European Single Market. There is no single
best possible version of a market economy to which all countries should
universally aspire in any given economic, social and legal context.
Second, the benefits from the established European Single Market, as
stated in the Cecchini Report, were grossly overestimated.
At the same time, and perhaps even more remarkably, the costs of
the established European Single Market were largely ignored. Any le-
gal framework for the market economy creates distributional effects. As
noted by Tsoukalis (2006), one of the leading experts on the European
integration, a Single Market created ‘winners’ as well as ‘losers:’ ‘Interest-
ingly enough, the Cecchini report had virtually nothing concrete to say
about the likely distribution of costs and benefits, apart from acknowl-
edging the problem and expressing the hope that redistributive policies,
supported by an active macroeconomic policy, would provide adequate
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compensation to losers or, even better, help weaker economies and re-
gions to face the strongwinds of completion unleashed by the elimination
of barriers’ (Tsoukalis 2006, 657–662).
Third, the last two decades, during which the current eu legal context
of a Single EuropeanMarket has been in place, do not represent the most
successful period of European integration. In fact, the current context
helped to create an increasing number of stagnating regions. The empir-
ical evidence for this claim can be found in the latest edition of the Eu-
rostat Regional Yearbook: ‘Out of the 271 nuts level 2 regions in the eu
for which data are available, the unemployment rate increased between
2007 and 2010 in 215 regions, remained unchanged in seven and fell in
49’ (Eurostat Union 2012, 78).
This evidence on European regional disparities clearly shows the
strong impact of the economic andfinancial crisis in the eu,whichmakes
the current framework of the European SingleMarket grossly inadequate
to cope with the magnitude of the crisis. Without a comprehensive and
proactive eu-wide response to the crisis, the entire eu project is becom-
ing increasingly unsustainable.
Fourth, in the period when the existing eu legal frameworkwas put in
place, a major shift in the organization of production, from Fordist mass
production to post-Fordist flexible production, occurred in many devel-
oped and developing countries around the world. Whereas the goal of
Fordist production is to produce large quantities of standardized goods
with the lowest possible costs to pursue economy of scale, the goal of
post-Fordist flexible production is to produce small quantities of high
value added products tailored to the needs of individual customers. This
new type of production requires substantial changes in the organization
of production, teams and firms, and has important implications for sup-
porting institutions, as it is based on constant innovations and improve-
ments of products and technologies.Michael Piore andCharles Sabel, the
pioneers in the area of flexible specialization, showed in their study that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, Fordist mass production is not always
themost efficient type of production. It canwork efficiently in the context
of stable demand; however, in the context of unstable, constantly chang-
ing demand, the flexible specialization can be a more efficient means of
production and organization of production. The shift from Fordism to
post-Fordism requires major organizational changes, changes in produc-
tion and reskilling of workers, and it presupposes shifts in public poli-
cies and supporting institutions (Piore and Sabel 1984, 28–30). The shift
from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ type of industrial policy presents an important
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part of the shift from traditional Fordist mass production to the mod-
ern, post-Fordist type of production. It seems that, during the creation of
the framework for a Single Market, the European decision-makers over-
looked these important historical shifts in the areas of production, orga-
nization of production, competition, and supportive public institutions.
Only a small number of advanced European regions or member states
can be described as post-Fordist – that is, highly innovative, flexible, dy-
namic, cohesive and knowledge-based.
Fifth, following the above discussion, themore appropriate debate dur-
ing the protracted European economic, financial and social crisis should
not be whether we need ‘more’ or ‘less’ of a Single Market, but rather
what kind of a Single Market European member states and their regions,
businesses, entrepreneurs, employees and citizens really need. We need
a more dynamic, supportive environment, as well as institutions at var-
ious levels of European polity that can translate business ideas and en-
trepreneurial initiatives into the practical market economy context.
We can conclude this chapter on the persistent dogma of neutrality of
the Single Market by stating that the sooner we leave behind this dogma,
the greater will be the chances for revitalization of a large part of the Eu-
ropean regions and member states. In order to achieve institutional re-
construction, more diversity, more policy space, and more ideas and ini-
tiatives should grow from the bottom-up. Now that even the most free-
market-oriented government in the eu, the uk government (or at least
its State Secretary for Business, Innovations and Skills Vince Cable) is
contemplating the need for new types of industrial policy, there is no rea-
son for the eu legal framework to remain overly constrained and biased
against the new types of industrial policy.
Rethinking the Modern European Industrial Policy
In the process of integration through law, the eu and its member states
have departed from the ‘old’ type of industrial policy to the highly con-
strained legal context of the weak type of industrial policy under the pri-
macy of a Single Market. It has been widely accepted that the undistorted
free market is the best guarantee for the efficiency and productivity of
European economies. Two decades after the completion of a Single Mar-
ket, the discussion should begin on how to revive modern, ‘new’ type
of industrial policy all levels of European polity. Two decades after the
adoption of the Maastricht treaty, it is becoming clear that the current
particular version of a European Single Market may be beneficial for Eu-
ropean retainable industries – that is, established industries effectively
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protected from new entrants due to high costs and lack of insufficient
support for start-ups – but at the high cost of excluding almost every-
body else. The idea of the strong articulation of the ‘new’ type of industrial
policy should begin to replace the dogma of neutrality of a European Sin-
gle Market. There is evidence that many supportive institutions, instru-
ments andpolicies to facilitate the restructuring are needed if increasingly
large number of stagnating European regions and member states. The
requirements to compete successfully in the period of the ‘knowledge-
based economy’ are substantially more difficult than the requirements to
compete successfully in the period of Fordist mass production. The for-
mer include, for example, a high quality of education provided to all cit-
izens; strong labour market institutions providing training for constant
reskilling; financial institutions providing and supporting the long-term
development of highly innovative firms, especially small andmedium size
firms and start-ups; andmany other supportive institutions and proactive
policies.
The distinctive need to rethink European industrial policy for the
twenty-first century began to be addressed by former Dutch Prime Min-
ister Kok but was abandoned due to the virtual period of growth based
on cheap credit before the European bubbles finally burst. The peripheral
regions are paying an extraordinary price, and increasingly many of the
core regions are doing so as well.
Before Kok’s report, the importance of industrial policywasmentioned
in the white paper on growth, competitiveness and employment (Com-
mission of the European Communities 1993, 14), which stated that ‘while
industrial policy continues to be controversial no one is in any doubt as to
the responsibility of governments and of the Community to create an en-
vironment as favourable as possible for company competitiveness.’ The
subsequent development of European integration all but marginalized
any development of industrial policies across Europe. However, today’s
record levels of unemployment, bleak labour market perspectives, low
growth rates and large number of stagnating regions and member states
clearly remind us that the time is ripe to revive European industrial pol-
icy.
What would the ‘new’ European industrial policy look like? First, it
would be important not to repeat the one-size-fits-all technocratic ap-
proach without taking into account the immense diversity in terms of
economic development and social cohesiveness. More innovative indus-
trial policies, instruments and measures should be adopted in a highly
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decentralized way. The role of European institutions should be to maxi-
mize the manoeuvre room for regional and national experimentation in
production and the organization of production (Unger 2001, 3). Addi-
tionally, European institutions can learn from successful examples and
disseminate them to other parts of the eu, not to mechanically imitate
successful practices from one region to another, but rather to present suc-
cessful examples as a source of inspiration and encouragement to other
stagnating European regions (Unger 2001, 3).
The ‘new’ European type of industrial policy, therefore, should be de-
centralized and participatory by invoking ideas and initiatives from lo-
cal producers, should be pluralistic in order to adjust to the different
needs and different productive potentials of different European regions
and should be experimentalist in order to permanently adjust, correct
and improve the strategic partnership between the private and public
sectors. The shift toward modern types of industrial policy began with
the shift from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible produc-
tion. On the other hand, European industrial policy, instead of trying to
transform its ‘old’ type of industrial policy to the ‘new’ type of industrial
policy, has mainly tied the hands of European institutions, national gov-
ernments and regional authorities. The reliance on the Single Market in
the last two decades trumped or diluted all other attempts to develop a
more pro-active approach toward steering and developing the economy.
What has been mainly overlooked, ignored and legally suppressed in
the European context is the transformation toward ‘new’ industrial pol-
icy, which has been pursued by some of the most advanced, innovative,
competitive and cohesive regions around the world. The characteristics
of the ‘new’ type of industrial policy were summarized by Best (1990, 11)
in his analysis of the emergence of post-Fordist regions engaging in what
he described as The New Competition: ‘The New Competition can be
distinguished from the old in four dimensions: organization of the firm,
types of coordination across phases in the production chain, organization
of the sector, and patterns of industrial policy. The New Competition is
about strategic actions within each dimension. The term “strategic” refers
to market-shaping activities in contrast with market-reacting responses.’
The comparative analysis of the emergence of The New Competion as
one possible and advanced type of ‘new’ industrial policy shows that suc-
cessful regions around the world – including Japan, the us, China and
advanced European regions – have developed various new forms of co-
operation and competition in the same segments of production.
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The new form of industrial policy is both much broader, in terms of
scope and instruments, and much less interventionist. Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Roberto Unger and Tamara Lothian from Columbia University
(2011), one of the leading proponents of new, transparent, innovative and
imaginative forms of collaboration between the public and private sec-
tor, is convinced that the new types of industrial policy should be agnostic
about sectors. In a joint piece on the possibilities to overcome the ongoing
economic, financial and social crisis, among other proposals, Lothian and
Unger (2011, 49) advocate the need to reinvent industrial policy means
to establish ‘a form of strategic coordination between governments and
firms that is pluralistic, participatory, and experimental. Its aim is to help
make the conditions and instruments of advanced production available
to larger parts of the economy and the society.’ The focus of such a pol-
icy should be on small and medium size enterprises as the key source of
jobs and output. More specifically,: ‘Its method should be the expansion
of access to credit, to technology, to advanced knowledge and practice,
to facilities for the organization of networks of cooperation that combine
the benefits of flexibility of scale. It’s characteristic concern should be to
propagate successful organizational and technological innovations wher-
ever they may arise’ (Lothian and Unger 2011, 49). On this basis, Lothian
andUnger have developed several components ofmodern industrial pol-
icy pursuing socially inclusive and broad-based economic development.
Perhaps the closest to the idea of decentralized cooperation as the new,
reinvented form of industrial policy was achieved in some of the ad-
vanced European regions and member states. The examples of Emilia
Romagna, Piedmont and other Italian regions should be mentioned, as
should local public-partnerships in Ireland. Innovative policies and high-
quality education in Finland as a basis for entrepreneurial and techno-
logical progress offer further examples of successful European industrial
policies (for more detailed analysis of advanced European regions, see
Nahtigal 2013).
Italian cooperative regions serve as examples of decentralized, flexi-
ble cooperation and partnership between the private and public spheres.
They created a system that became known as the system of cooperation
competition, in which dense networks of small and medium-sized enter-
prises in industrial districts cooperate and compete at the same time in
the same segments of production. While this system may not be entirely
compatible with the European rules of competition, in recent decades
it has helped these Italian regions to develop one of the most advanced
systems of production, innovation, cooperation, and competition in the
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world. The system is highly inclusive, and its level of social cohesion is at
the highest level (Nahtigal 2013, 612).
The problem with these examples across the eu is that, despite their
potential broader implications, they remain limited to a very small num-
ber of advanced European regions. The true goal of eu economic and
social recovery, therefore, is to expand and further innovate instruments
and policies. This goal has led to the call for fewer legal constraints at
the European level and for more room to manoeuvre at the regional and
national levels across the eu to implement the ‘new’ modern types of in-
dustrial policy. It should be noted that a Single Market andmodern types
of industrial policy are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the possibility
to redefine certain tenets of a European Single Market depends on our
common understanding of its content and legal framework. European
regions and member states should not be left to the mercy of the invisi-
ble hand. They should not primarily depend on the European transfers,
which are not allocated – at least not in sufficient amounts. It is not even
feasible to have a Transfer Union to sufficiently support the excluded and
stagnating European regions and member states. Instead, these regions
and member states should be empowered and equipped to restructure
and revive their economies and societies based on their potential, initia-
tives and aspirations.
Conclusions
Between the laissez-faire and dirigiste approaches, there is a large amount
of room to manoeuvre to develop more pro-active industrial and devel-
opment policies. New forms of industrial policies can and should be rein-
vented and implemented across the eu – not to harm or distort competi-
tion but rather to further enhance it. More than one form and framework
exist for both a Single Market and the competition policies. On the Euro-
pean level, a legal framework and policies should be adopted that would
be able to steer between foreclosing andopening themarkets andbetween
negative and positive aspects of competitive policies. A new balancemust
be achieved, both at the European level and at the level of European re-
gions andmember states, to allow formoremanoeuvre room,more space
for development and more instruments and policy tools for the Euro-
pean regions and member states. Advocates of modern, advanced forms
of industrial polices have increasing put forth convincing arguments as to
why industrial policy, especially in its modern form, should not be aban-
doned. In the last few decades, when industrial policy was mentioned or
implemented, it was deemed as obsolete and outdated. During the pro-
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tracted crisis, however, even the most developed countries in many cases
returned to the instruments of ‘old,’ traditional types and ‘new,’ modern
types of industrial policy. Examples include the restructuring of gm with
the abundant help of the us federal government, the large support for
‘green’ investments in the car industry around theworld, the variousmea-
sures taken by the German federal government in the case of Opel and
many other examples.Massive support for the financial institutions in the
us and eu should be mentioned in this context.
Ha-JoonChang, professor of development economics fromCambridge
University, argues for the adoption of a more balanced and subtle ap-
proach toward the theory and practice of industrial policy. Industrial pol-
icy has been an important instrument throughout economic history, and
almost all of the leading industrial nations in theworld have implemented
it in various ways throughout their economic progress (Chang 2009). As
can be witnessed from the recent years of crisis, themost advanced coun-
tries in the world did not hesitate to return to various measures of in-
dustrial policy when they needed it. The existing legal constraints in the
European and subsequently national contexts are increasingly difficult to
defend theoretically and practically. The need to rebalance and redefine
the constrained rules of a Single Market is becoming increasingly visible.
Of course, more space and more scope for modern industrial policy
should not be viewed as a simple magic wand. It is only one additional
instrument in an effort to revive ailing European industries and regions.
A similar approach should be applied in the context of international trade
rules. On the other hand, industrial policy can be also ineffective. There
are many examples of failed industrial policy efforts in both developed
and developing countries. Modern types of industrial policy have addi-
tional safeguards, but there is no ultimate guarantee about its efficiency,
which depends on many factors, including transparency and account-
ability of the policy-makers. For this reason, modern industrial policy
has to steer between Scylla and Charibdis; as described by Unger (2007,
144–145); it has to avoid the ‘twin evil’ by steering between bureaucratic
dogmatism and favouritism. There is a distinct risk of abuse of the in-
struments and tools of industrial policy. Modern industrial policy pre-
supposes high-quality public institutions with highly competent admin-
istration. It requires autonomy and accountability of the public adminis-
tration to counter the pressures of various interest groups.
While there are dangers and risks involved in carrying out modern
types of industrial policy, the alternative – doing nothing – almost cer-
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tainly leads to continuous stagnation. In all likelihood, it may lead to a
strong hierarchy on the Single Market – that is, a strong concentration
of economic development in only a small number of advanced eu re-
gions and member states. The proposal to revive and articulate modern
types of industrial policies across the eu is a call for comprehensive eco-
nomic and social restructuring. The task of modern industrial policy is
to organize and strengthen capabilities of restructuring in the direction
of high-productivity activities. Rodrik (2007), one of the leading propo-
nents of modern industrial policy for the twenty-first century, warns that
restructuring is not an automatic process but rather requires a collective,
deliberative approach: ‘[I]ndustrial policy is a process of strategic collab-
oration between the private and public sectors, where the objectives are
to identify blockages and obstacles to new investments and to design ap-
propriate policies in response’ (Rodrik 2007, 234–245).
The proposal to broaden the scope and objectives of industrial policies
in the existing European legal framework is only one of the first steps to-
ward comprehensive European restructuring, the ultimate goal of which
should be to create a more balanced, more inclusive and more pluralis-
tic Europe than we witness within the increasingly restrictive European
framework.
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